Showing posts with label preflop strategy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label preflop strategy. Show all posts

Saturday, November 3, 2012

Weighing The Odds in Hold'Em Poker by King Yao. A review.



Day trader turned card shark King Yao's Weighing The Odds in Hold'Em is a personal tour de force on Limit Hold'Em that is heavy on numbers and explanation, though much of the advice is open ended.

Weighing the Odds is an odds and stats book, more than a how-to book on playing effective limit hold'em.  It assumes a rudimentary knowledge of the game at least, and is aimed either at novice players looking to form a winning style, or for experienced players looking to build a stronger foundation to their game.

Yao's initial chapters on reading opponents and bluffing show this book's strategies may not work as well in looser low-limit games, where players are oblivious to other players' strategic moves (like bluffs), and many more players will call to see the flop and later streets with poorer draws or made hands regardless of who is betting and when.

Yao later admits his strategic advice works best at a table with two good players, three 'decent' players and three bad players, which is a tougher game than the typical low limit hold'em game at a cardroom.  The relatively high rake at the lower limits would ensure no one in Yao's ideal game was a winner in the long run.  Yao's strategy is certainly best suited for middle and higher limits, where players are generally smarter and the rake has far less impact.  It can also work in online games, as online poker sites take a lower percentage of rake and players in relatively low levels play with greater skill.

That said, Yao's book features lengthy discussion on counting outs and brings two valuable concepts to the table.

1) The DIPO Method: Yao's acronym stands for, "Do I have Pot Odds?"  Yao composes a simple method for determining whether a call is correct when drawing to a particular number of outs.  Using a "Good Number" and a "Bad Number," a player that knows his/her number of outs can more quickly determine whether a call on a particular street is correct.

2) A detailed starting hand selection.  About halfway through the book, Yao presents a table about five pages long with detailed instructions on playable starting hands in each position.

For every position (early, middle, late) Yao provides instructions for each hand (or a group) on how to play the hand whe 1st in, against limpers, against a raise, and against a raise with callers.  He follows this with an explanation on how to play the blinds, common mistakes to avoid in each position, and what you should try to do when you play each particular group of hands.

You will not find a more complete starting hand guide to Limit Hold'Em out there, not even in Small Stakes Hold'Em.


True to the title, Weighing The Odds centers around the mathematically correct plays to make, the plays that will net the most expected value.  The book is math intensive and fairly dense to read through, like a Two Plus Two book, but with less theory and more statistical math.

A beginner may want to seek out simpler materials before moving up to this book, but anyone looking to improve their game, move up to more advanced games, and make more statistically correct plays will gain from reading this text.

Thursday, October 18, 2012

Full Tilt Tournament Strategy Guide, a review



Full Tilt Poker's Tournament Strategy Guide reeks of a gimmicked attempt by the popular online poker site to capitalize on the poker book boom.  But Michael Craig's compilation of poker essays from the site's top pros carries a lot of useful, in some cases groundbreaking material.  Albeit, some of the material also leaves a lot to be desired, remaining too general in scope and adding little more than general ideas and basic tips.

Full Tilt founder Chris Ferguson writes several of the books chapters, and while he throws out a variety of useful ideas, figuring out how to situationally apply his advice is left entirely up to the reader.

In fact, this is a universal theme of the book, just like many other poker books.  A lot of principles and ideas are not too fleshed out, and calling the book a Strategy Guide may be abit misleading, as few of the chapters do much to guide the reader.  It's a lot like telling a lost tourist, "Well, you'll want to follow the signs, and pay attention to landmarks."

As the chapters were written by different perspectives, many of the chapters disagree with material and ideas in previous chapters, and some are written better than others.

  • Howard Lederer's chapter on leverage brings forth a neat concept but Lederer never elaborates on concrete principle application of the subject.
  • Gavin Smith's ideas on big stack play are so basic that they should be common sense.
  • Mike Matusow has a couple of neat ideas in his Omaha Hi-Lo chapter, but the chapter has little more use than a random magazine article.
  • Richard Brodie's ideas on sit & go play are covered in far greater depth by other materials (like Colin Moshman's Sit N' Go Strategy).
  • The gimmicky textual conversation on Razz between Huck Seed and Ted Forrest doesn't give the reader much of use.
  • And Ted Forrest doesn't seem sure himself of what exactly he's discussing in his chapter "(Don't) Pay Like Ted Forrest."

But as weak as some chapters, some of the material has very strong, concrete strategic advice.

Andy Bloch strikes the motherload in his chapter "Play Before The Flop," which goes into great detail on hand selection in No Limit Hold'Em tournaments.  Bloch provides multiple charts that focus on win percentages against particular ranges of hands, plus a chart that provides a framework for the reader to create his own selection of starting hands.  Bloch does provide a sample chart of starting hands, but it's almost an afterthought once he provides the methodology for the reader to create their own.  This chapter alone might be worth the purchase of the book for an aspiring No Limit Hold'Em tournament player, even granted the filler that precedes it.

Other chapters prove useful as well.

  • Chris Ferguson puts better work into his No Limit Hold'Em chapter "Play After The Flop" as his examples infer more concrete ideas the reader can cross-apply.
  • Phil Gordon's chapter on "Short Stack Play" has some useful, unique ideas.
  • Howard Lederer provides great detail on situational strategy in his Limit Hold'Em chapter, though he provides a tight, limited hand selection chart without Bloch's advice on how the reader may frame his own.
  • Keith Sexton gives useful, applicable advice on Stud Hi-Lo.

The Full Tilt Tournament Strategy Guide has some useful concepts, but you have to sift through a lot of jumbled, sometimes hollow material to get to the good stuff.  Certain sections may hold enough value to warrant the purchase themselves, but purchasing this book is akin to purchasing an album with a few good songs surrounded by filler tracks.  If the songs are that good, the album's worth getting, but you may pass if you're in it for the collective product.

Bloch's chapter is groundbreaking, and experienced players looking for random ideas to cross-apply to their tournament game may find the book worth their while.  However, if you're looking to play tournament Stud, Omaha, or H.O.R.S.E., you may still be better served learning the hard way: through trial and error at minimal expense.

The cost of this book may not significantly improve your overall game, as once you've read it... true to the context of the book, you're still completely on your own.

Wednesday, February 25, 2009

Middle Position EV for Suited Broadways

(This will be the last post today. Late Position and subsequent trials will post tomorrow.)

Middle Position EV for Suited Broadways (100K Trials)
Starting
Hands
Open
Call
Open
Raise
Limp
Behind
Raise
Limpers
Cold
Call
3bet
Raiser
AKs3.623.494.034.492.512.96
AQs2.462.592.943.540.810.98
AJs1.272.001.762.91-0.39-0.36
A10s0.951.571.462.45-0.86-1.23
KQs0.921.061.441.86-0.90-1.03
KJs0.811.011.351.47-0.96-1.72
K10s0.450.520.741.01-1.41-2.15
QJs0.490.620.951.34-1.31-1.96
Q10s0.190.240.590.53-1.48-2.42
J10s0.130.080.370.44-1.57-2.26

Early Position EV for Suited Broadways

Early Position EV for Suited Broadways (100K Trials)
Starting
Hands
Open
Call
Open
Raise
Limp
Behind
Raise
Limpers
Cold
Call
3bet
Raiser
AKs3.533.343.644.291.872.17
AQs1.722.372.263.28-0.42-0.85
AJs1.441.881.582.54-1.40-2.55
A10s1.081.381.272.06-1.61-3.07
KQs0.680.911.021.37-1.99-3.54
KJs0.840.740.850.92-1.36-2.78
K10s0.220.240.250.29-1.60-2.89
QJs0.390.360.380.66-1.64-2.89
Q10s0.050.01-0.05-0.10-1.69-3.04
J10s0.05-0.09-0.23-0.52-1.41-2.77

UTG Expected Value for Suited Broadways

Let's move along to suited Broadways: any two unpaired cards ten or higher, such as Ace-King or Jack-Ten, with matching suits.

We will begin our trials from under the gun, and proceed around the horn.

Under the Gun EV
for Suited Broadways
(100K Trials)
Starting HandsOpen CallOpen Raise
AKs3.413.18
AQs1.492.11
AJs1.151.36
A10s0.811.05
KQs0.430.73
KJs0.490.53
K10s0.160.03
QJs0.320.33
Q10s-0.78-0.19
J10s-0.37-0.06

Tuesday, February 24, 2009

EV for Pocket Pairs from the Big Blind when raised

Since we can check and see the flop in unraised pots from the Big Blind, we will only concern ourselves with hands where we're raised. Here, as before with the small blind, our baseline is not 0.00, since we have $3 invested before the cards are dealt. Thus our baseline is -3.00. To play a hand, the EV must be greater than -3.00.

EV for Pocket Pairs
Big Blind (100k Trials)
Starting
Hand
Cold
Call
3-Bet
Raiser
AA12.4917.28
KK6.739.36
QQ3.455.49
JJ1.062.18
TT-0.420.24
99-1.48-1.04
88-2.08-1.74
77-2.24-2.45
66-2.51-2.75
55-2.71-3.01
44-2.90-3.25
33-2.99-3.72
22-3.17-3.92

EV for Pocket Pairs in the Small Blind

Keep in mind here that, unlike the other positions, where we can fold without investing a single dollar in the pot, we are forced to invest $1 in the small blind every time in a 3/6 game. Therefore we are looking not for hands whose EV is above 0.00, but whose EV is above -1.00, the net result when we fold our hand in the small blind.

EV for Pocket Pairs
Small Blind (100k Trials)
Starting
Hand
Limp
Behind
Raise
Limpers
Cold
Call
3-Bet
Raiser
AA8.0912.5113.2415.81
KK5.078.707.449.00
QQ3.676.694.435.62
JJ2.234.872.182.63
TT1.223.340.561.02
990.081.73-0.55-0.33
88-0.590.78-1.17-1.04
77-1.12-0.02-1.77-1.68
66-1.52-1.04-2.12-1.98
55-1.87-1.43-2.56-2.40
44-2.13-1.93-1.89-2.49
33-2.51-2.22-1.94-2.67
22-2.78-2.58-2.08-3.00

Monday, February 23, 2009

EV for Pocket Pairs on the Button

EV for Pocket Pairs on the Button (100k Trials)
Starting
Hand
Open
Call
Open
Raise
Limp
Behind
Raise
Limpers
Cold
Call
3-Bet
Raiser
AA6.497.049.9814.1514.8618.32
KK4.304.956.8610.478.109.80
QQ3.373.915.127.914.525.24
JJ2.653.103.526.062.082.23
TT1.952.362.584.270.750.82
991.331.671.422.76-0.10-0.47
880.830.990.821.87-0.63-1.34
770.310.380.291.15-0.98-1.58
66-0.090.080.030.66-1.14-1.93
55-0.45-0.30-0.290.13-1.44-2.35
44-0.78-0.59-0.54-0.35-1.67-2.52
33-1.04-0.91-0.68-0.56-1.80-2.78
22-1.27-1.10-0.82-0.79-1.96-2.67

Saturday, February 21, 2009

Late Position EV for Pocket Pairs

Again, cumulative notes to follow later.

Late Position EV for Pocket Pairs (100K Trials)
Starting
Hand
Open
Call
Open
Raise
Limp
Behind
Raise
Limpers
Cold
Call
3-Bet
Raiser
AA8.588.9611.4014.2714.9117.70
KK5.576.277.3010.528.4510.04
QQ4.234.845.318.034.945.87
JJ3.033.503.535.762.813.11
TT2.022.512.423.991.051.46
991.341.491.162.370.04-0.02
880.520.760.571.37-0.60-0.66
77-0.020.21-0.010.69-0.87-1.33
66-0.52-0.13-0.080.39-1.07-1.54
55-0.89-0.67-0.32-0.17-1.39-2.08
44-1.22-0.99-0.69-0.49-1.64-2.15
33-1.35-1.08-0.85-0.75-1.85-2.41
22-1.66-1.22-1.02-0.88-1.88-2.49

Thursday, February 19, 2009

Middle position EV trials

Notes to follow at a later date.

Middle Position EV for Pocket Pairs (100K Trials)
Starting
Hand
Open
Call
Open
Raise
Limp
Behind
Raise
Limpers
Cold
Call
Reraise
AA11.9510.7613.8614.7516.5817.89
KK6.827.378.3310.419.1010.21
QQ4.735.136.167.764.885.71
JJ3.343.553.865.252.192.72
TT1.952.412.263.400.630.49
990.851.391.061.73-0.29-0.81
88-0.090.550.380.88-0.92-1.32
77-0.59-0.46-0.180.30-1.43-2.04
66-1.07-0.73-0.30-0.07-1.56-2.27
55-1.48-1.19-0.74-0.42-1.86-2.58
44-1.74-1.49-0.85-0.92-2.01-2.74
33-2.05-1.70-1.11-1.07-2.09-2.88
22-2.22-2.04-1.43-1.54-2.17-2.97

Saturday, December 20, 2008

King-high hands in middle position

King-high hands carry 2nd nut flush potential when suited, and top pair potential either way. King-broadway hands also carry higher chances of a straight than Ace-high hands, as they have chances of flopping an open ended straight draw, which has higher odds of trning the straight than a broadway or gutshot straight draw. However, they are behind right off the bat to any Ace-high hands and can be outkicked when the kicker pairs, if someone holds an Ace and pairs the same card.

The only King hand Maverick likes to raise against limpers is KQs. After that, it will only limp behind with KJs, K10s and KQo. Every other hand, even though you open raise with them, gets folded against any action in front. Against a raise, Maverick will only play KQs and KJs.

HandAction
When
1st in
Action
With
Limpers
Action
When
Raised
Net $
Per Hand
(3/6)
KQsRaiseRaiseCall1.09
KJsRaiseLimpCall1.02
K10sRaiseLimpFold0.72
K9sRaiseFoldFold0.00
K8sRaiseFoldFold-0.31
K7sRaiseFoldFold-0.21
KQoRaiseLimpFold0.04
KJoRaiseFoldFold-0.03


And as we can see, Maverick's selective for good reason. KQs was the most profitable at $1.09 a hand, a little over 1/3 of a small bet. Only KJs and K10s showed any significant profitability besides KQs. KQo finished a hair above even and K9s finished just about even. All other hands were a loser.

Offsuit aces in middle position

Maverick only plays offsuit Aces with a broadway kicker in MP, raising when facing one bet, but only playing for two or more bets with AK or AQ. The key with these hands, if they don't hit the unlikely Broadway straight, trips or two pair, is to flop top pair with either top kicker or a strong kicker.

HandAction
When
1st in
Action
With
Limpers
Action
When
Raised
Net $
Per Hand
(3/6)
AKoRaiseRaiseReraise2.60
AQoRaiseRaiseCall1.39
AJoRaiseRaiseFold0.91
A10oRaiseRaiseFold0.55


All four hands deemed playable turned a profit. No hands below A10o were tested given early position trials showed significant dropoffs and subsequent losses for hands A9o and below. 10's tend to show as the profitability cutoff point in these trials.

Suited aces in middle position

Suited Aces carry the key strength of the maximum potential for a nut flush when 3 cards of their suit hit the board. In middle position, Maverick raises limpers with broadway Ace suited hands, calls with other Aces down to A4s, open raises with any suited Ace, and will only play against a raise with Ace broadway suited: it will call with AJs and A10s, but will 3-bet with AQs and AKs.

HandAction
When
1st in
Action
With
Limpers
Action
When
Raised
Net $
Per Hand
(3/6)
AKsRaiseRaiseReraise4.10
AQsRaiseRaiseReraise2.79
AJsRaiseRaiseCall1.96
A10sRaiseRaiseCall1.44
A9sRaiseCallFold0.62
A8sRaiseCallFold0.40
A7sRaiseCallFold0.06
A6sRaiseCallFold-0.07
A5sRaiseCallFold-0.07
A4sRaiseCallFold-0.26
A3sRaiseFoldFold-0.29
A2sRaiseFoldFold-0.29


Proftiability as played remains until you get down to A7s, where the profitability as played is slight at best, then everything below A7s is a loser. Once you get below A10s, the suited Aces' only real value comes from their flush potential, as when the Aces pair, their kickers are weak, leaving holders with a second best hand when someone else plays their stronger Ace.

Even when you pair the weaker kicker, the pair is rarely top pair on the flop, let alone by the river, typically leaving you with 5 outs to improve (three Aces and two more of your weaker kicker). Only when a player lands two pair or trips does the hand retain strong value. Axs is a hand limited in its drawing potential if the x isn't 10 or higher.

Friday, December 19, 2008

Middle position profitability for middle pairs in middle position

For each hand set, I will list the Maverick preflop strategy when 1st to enter the pot, when others have limped in front, and when someone has raised in front. When a player behind reraises after the simulator has entered a pot, the simulator is instructed to call an extra bet for nearly all hands listed.

If it's two or more bets back to the simulator, it won't continue without a supremely strong hand like AA, KK, QQ or AK, maybe JJ. If the simulator reraised itself, it did so with a very strong hand like AA, KK, AQ or QQ. It's likely the action will not come back to him, or that betting will be capped preflop if it does, in which case the simulator would probably stay in. If it's two more bets back to the simulator, it's likely someone has one of the aforementioned monsters, and obviously there's little value to continuing with a hand like AJ or KQ, which is probably way behind before the flop.

The following table illustrates 100,000 hand trials in middle position for playable pairs 99 to 55, which fall in the Maverick profile's playable range. Pairs ten and up aren't included, since those hands are definite winners in any position for two bets, even more in most cases. For example, there's no need to run trials for pocket Aces, when we know pocket Aces is a big winner whether for one, two or four bets.

HandAction
When
1st in
Action
With
Limpers
Action
When
Raised
Net $
Per Hand
(3/6)
99RaiseRaiseCall1.25
88RaiseRaiseCall0.40
77RaiseCallCall-0.56
66RaiseCallFold-0.63
55RaiseFoldFold-1.42


Notice how the profitability coincides with the aggressiveness exercised when other players limp in front. For all playable pairs (as with all hands under Maverick), you would raise if 1st in, but your strategy varies when others enter the pot before you.

My key observation is that hands that limp behind other limpers show far less profitability, but they're also lower in rank, increasing the risk of overcards and getting outdrawn on the flop (if they're not already facing overpairs preflop). Granted, this is a risk regardless, and the idea overall is probably to play cheap and hope to flop a set, or fold. 88 and higher play strong enough that they could win on their own in some cases, plus of course Broadway pairs (AA-TT) usually can win on their own.

Nonetheless, limping allows other marginal hands to limp behind, increasing this likelihood that a hand will outdraw on the flop. So I tested 77 and 66 over 100K hands each with a strategy to raise against limpers instead of limping along, to deter marginal hands behind and thin the field. I omitted 55 because it's -1.42 loss rate indicates that even an improved strategy wouldn't make it profitable from MP.



HandLimp
Net $
Raise
Net $
77-0.56-0.38
66-0.63-0.30


Raising limpers reduced the loss of each hand, but did not make the hand profitable. And as we saw in previous trials, open limping these hands instead of open raising them almost always reduces the expected value of a hand, and when it improves the value, the improvement is typically insigificant. The potential improvement of limping either of these hands likely wouldn't offset the $0.30+ losses per hand that these hands see.

Thursday, December 18, 2008

A look at the Maverick preflop strategy

The Maverick strategy follows a varied, somewhat convoluted preflop strategy in middle position.

When first in: Raise AA-55, all suited Aces, AKo-A10o, KQs-K7s, KQo, KJo, QJs-Q8s, QJo, J10s-J8s, 10-9s, 10-8s and 98s.

Limpers in front: Raise AA-88, AKs-A10s, AKo-A10o and KQs. Call 77-66, A9s-A4s, KJs-K10s, KQo, QJs-Q10s and J10s.

Raised in front: Reraise AA-TT, AKs, AQs and AKo. Cold call JJ, TT, and AQs.

Fold any hand not listed for that particular situation.

You'll notice that for some hands, you'll raise if 1st in, but fold them to a raise, or raise them when facing one bet, but fold them when facing a raise. You can open raise with K9s, but if anyone enters the pot in front, you'll fold, even for one bet. Or you'll enter a pot for one bet with A5s, even raise if 1st in, but you'll fold against a raise.

David Sklansky refers to this paradox as the Gap Concept, where a player needs a stronger hand to call a raise than he needs to make the raise in the first place. In layman's terms, when no one has raised in front, it's likely that your hand is stronger than the hands of those before you, whether they folded or called. Plus, when you raise and make it two bets to call for everyone after you, they typically won't enter unless they have strong hands themselves. Your raise indicates a strong hand, even if you raise with a marginal hand like Q8s. Open raising increases the strength of your hand, as players behind you with marginal hands will fold them, reducing your opposition.

However, if someone were to raise from early position, it's likely you're facing a big pocket pair or a big broadway hand like AQ. Q8s doesn't match up well against AQ or pocket Jacks, so you should fold to a raise. But if everyone in front has limped, your Q8s is likely competitive. If you're the first player to bet preflop, your Q8s not only may be the strongest hand, but it's less likely that anyone else at the table has a hand stronger than that, because the first few players have folded.

You'll also notice that you'll call a raise with suited versions of hands you would not play against a raise if unsuited, such as AJ. The suitedness gives you an opportunity for Ace, King or Queen high flushes if two of your suit flops, even a dim chance thereat if one of your suit flops. This adds to the high pair potential and vague broadway straight potential of hands like AJ and KQ. With offsuit hands, you're basically banking on spiking top pair or better, maybe a straight.

With the $3 max rake and $1-2 jackpot drop of a 3/6 game, hand values get undercut, and the key is to find the hands that retain positive value after these cuts. The optimal end strategy will be tighter than the typical winning low limit strategy, but this will minimize leaks and ensure maximum profitability.

Monday, December 15, 2008

Examining software strategic profiles for profitability in a typical 3/6 game

Before proceeding with middle position trials, I wanted to make sure we were using an optimal strategy. I decided to run some preliminary 500K trials on Wilson Turbo Texas Hold'Em using the following profiles:

Conan the Librarian: Typical tight aggressive profile that plays about 18% of hands.
Bret Maverick: The v6.0 Advisor. The software author's optimal Limit Hold'Em strategy as derived from lengthy research.
Nicely Nicely Johnson: Tight aggressive preflop, but plays hands passively postflop, keeping pots as cheap as possible until the big hands hit. I have noted in previous trials that this profile has shown routine, minor profitability in some 3/6 environments.
Gypsy Rose: Tight passive pre, playing the same hands as a typical TAG but rarely raising. Tight aggressive postflop.
Lee Jones Hybrid strategy: Programmed in manually. Preflop strategy is taken from Lee Jones' Winning Low Limit Hold'Em. Postflop strategy is a cautious, relatively passive strategy that avoids aggression without a strong made hand or strong draw.

I simulated 500,000 hands for each profile in a 3/6 Limit Hold'Em game with a 10% $4 max rake and $1 jackpot drop (to simulate typical Seattle area conditions: 10% $3 max rake with a $1-2 jackpot drop) plus a $1 toke for every pot larger than $13 (leaving 2 big bets).

For opponents, I used a set of 8 average profiles, of which two or three were TAG profiles and the remaining profiles a bit loose (35% of hands played) but reasonably thoughtful, with one or two programmed to draw regardless of pot odds (typical of some weak players in low limit games).

To properly simulate a typical, not-as-friendly low limit game, I made sure none of these profiles were particularly loose. I also set the simulator to periodically vary the strategy of these other profiles to mix things up. This table saw an average of 3.8 players to the flop. This is not a friendly game, but the idea is to develop a strategy that can beat a sub-optimal low limit game. Any loose low limit game can be potentially profitable despite the rake, but such conditions aren't frequent, and with the current recession, such conditions will become more rare as fish and dead money disappear.

ProfileNet $
per hand
Conan-0.12
Maverick-0.08
Nicely-0.11
Gypsy-0.09
Lee Jones-0.05

As you can see, all these hands post a net loss over 500,000 hands. As experts say in their texts, these tight strategies indeed cannot turn a profit at 3/6 due to the rake and jackpot drop.

All of these strategies have playable hands that lose money at such a 3/6 table. I believed I could improve the profitability of each strategy by eliminating the starting hands that showed a long term loss over several thousand samples. For each strategy, I decided to improve the starting hand requirements using a simple, crude method I examined data the chosen starting hands and noted only the hands that turned a significant profit (more than $0.10 per hand), eliminating the others.

On average, the following hands showed a profit with each profile: Pairs AA-88, AKs-A8s, AKo-AQo, KQs-K10s, QJs, J10s. All other playable hands posted a loss, including small pairs, suited connectors down to 54s, weak suited Aces, suited Kings down to K7s, suited Queens down to Q8s, suited Jacks down to J8s, and unlisted offsuit Broadway hands.

Each profile had its share of limited exceptions: Maverick and Conan profited with AJo and A10o. Maverick turned a profit with KQo. Maverick and Gypsy profited with Q10s, plus Maverick turned a profit with 10-9s. The Lee Jones profile won with 77. Some also turned a loss with the aforementioned profit hands: 88, A9s and K10s were losers for Nicely. Maverick and Nicely turned a loss with 88 and QJs. Granted, some of these losses could also be a factor of how the strategies played these hands preflop: raising with these hands could be a leak, or maybe the hands are played too passively. But we'll examine the strategy for hands later.

For now, I omitted the leak hands for each profile and ran another 500K test with revised starting hand requirements in the same environment. From here, I'm looking for significant improvements in win rate (or in this case, reductions in loss rate). I also cleaned up the strategies: allowing for more limping behind with draw hands such as Axs and small pairs, knowing the postflop strategy would dump them on the flop if a set or flush draw didn't flop. The original strategies, for some reason, didn't exercise this strategy with limpers in front, curious since most times you limp behind, you will see a multiway flop with the implied odds to draw, or flop a big hand that's way ahead, even if you have to call an extra bet when someone raises behind you.

The results are noted along with the original results below:

ProfileOriginal
Net $
per hand
Revised
Net $
per hand
Conan-0.12-0.02
Maverick-0.08-0.02
Nicely-0.11-0.08
Gypsy-0.09-0.05
Lee Jones-0.05-0.04


Again, all profiles showed a net loss, but certain profiles saw significant improvement in profitability potential, while others barely budged.

While the Lee Jones profile showed the least loss originally, an adjustment of the starting hand strategy netted minimal improvement. This is likely because the starting requirements for the Jones profile were tighter originally than the others, so there was minimal room for improvement. The other strategies had relatively loose starting hand requirements, playing weaker suited Kings, Queens and Jacks in middle position, for example. Once the K7s and Q8s hands were ditched, most of the strategies improved quite a bit, though they still posted a loss.

The biggest net improvment came from the Conan profile, which produced the biggest original loss, but immediately improved to tie for the lowest loser with the Maverick profile, the official software advisor, which also saw a significant improvement, though not as great.

Though these starting requirements were deemed optimal by software designers, they also assume games with a minimal rake, while dismissing lesser games as unbeatable. Bob Wilson himself has noted how a relatively higher rake can turn a normally profitable hand into an unprofitable hand, though stronger hands still remain profitable despite it.This leads  me to believe that the key to finding a profitable 3/6 strategy is to take a normal strategy and eliminate lesser drawing hands whose payoffs are reduced by the rake, or at least reduce the circumstances in which they're played to profitable circumstances.

As we see here, by noting the drawing hands that post a loss and eliminating them from the starting strategy, while maintaining a typically solid postflop strategy, you can improve your profitability in games with a relatively high rake.

Now, before we begin trials in middle position, which profile will we use as a strategic baseline? While the Conan profile showed the biggest improvement, I decided to go with the software advisor Maverick. The end profitability was the same, and while it didn't improve as much once the starting strategy was sharpened, it also originated with a small loss rate than the Conan profile. It is also the advisor, which the designers concluded was an optimal strategy, and its solid postflop parameters are fairly similar to the Conan profile, if not nearly the same. And finally, the starting hand selection for the Maverick profile is a bit looser than Conan, which will allow me to run trials for more starting hands directly from the profile, without needing to manually configure a revised profile to test additional hands.

In trials for middle position, late position and the blinds, I will focus on the hand selection for the Maverick profile as our control profile. Later, we'll run tests for the Conan profile in kind, and see if we note any improvements in profit.